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Summary
Following the global financial crisis, many countries have embarked on fundamental
reviews of their regulatory systems in an attempt to identify the causes of the near
collapse in financial systems and to pave the way for a new approach to regulation. The
focus of this paper concerns the intellectual assumptions on which previous regulatory
approaches have largely been built, both in the UK and in a number of other countries.
We examine the analysis provided by the UK’s Turner Review (2009) which follows the
“market failure” approach to regulation and we contrast this with the alternative “state
failure” approach. Both approaches only offer partial and polarised views into the causes
of the crisis. We offer a synthesis and argue that a new conceptual approach to the
management of financial markets is required. The essence of this new approach is the
recognition that the state and regulation are not external to the market. While this paper
largely relates to the UK, it provides potentially important lessons for many other
countries.
Contributors to any debate about the regulation of competitive markets usually adopt
one of two approaches. The first approach is based upon the theory of “market failure”.
Subject to certain conditions, the theory postulates that free competitive markets
generate higher economic welfare than centrally planned markets. It is recognised,
however, that there are circumstances when competitive markets fail to achieve the
most efficient outcomes due to information asymmetry, externalities and other
imperfections. In these circumstances, regulation by the state is judged to be justified in
order to correct perceived market failures.
The alternative approach is based upon the theory of “state failure”. Elected
representatives and state officials do not always act in the public interest. They pursue
their own interests and those of special interest groups. Even if they are motivated to act
in the interests of maximising public economic welfare, they are unable to collect and
assess the required information to make informed and sound decisions. Regulators have
bounded rationality. Regulation, therefore, fails to achieve its objectives and often has
unforeseen and damaging consequences.
The UK’s Turner Review (2009) adopts the market failure approach. The Review does
acknowledge regulatory failure but this failure is seen as one of insufficient regulation.
The assumption is that regulation has failed by acts of omission rather than commission.
The prescription, therefore, is for more regulation.
Other commentators, for example those published by the Institute of Economic Affairs
(Philip Booth 2009; Tim Congdon 2009), adopt the state failure approach. They contend
that inappropriate government policies contributed towards the genesis of the crisis in
financial markets and that the ineptitude of government officials in response to the crisis
then exacerbated the emerging problems rather than solving them. Government officials
failed to anticipate the problems building up in the system; they have no special insight
and are unlikely to be able to anticipate the next crisis. The prescription is, therefore,
very different from that now proposed by the UK’s Financial Services Authority.
In this paper, we examine both approaches. The arguments advanced in each case are
persuasive but inevitably, each side offers only a partial and polarised view. We offer a
synthesis, a new approach to the issue of the management of a complex financial
system. The essence of this new approach is the recognition that politicians, government
officials and market participants are part of one and the same system. Traditionally,
economic theory and strategic management theory regard government policy and
regulation as external to the market, as exogenous. Specifically, in strategic
management theory, regulation is seen as an environmental variable to which managers
in regulated companies need to adapt to achieve competitive advantage. But in today's
complex world, this model is too simplistic. Politicians, government officials and
regulators and senior managers in regulated companies are actors on the same stage.
Regulation is endogenous. We develop this argument in this paper. We then offer an
agenda for the development of theory and practice in the management of financial
markets. We use this analysis to offer a preliminary risk assessment of the Financial
Services Authority (FSA) proposals and outline the mitigating actions required. Although
the UK regulation environment provides the focus for this paper, it is hoped that it will
offer some potentially important insights for other countries.
1. The Market Failure Approach to Regulation
1.1 Fundamental theoretical issues
At paragraph 1.4, The Turner Review (2009) raises questions about the intellectual
assumptions on which previous regulatory approaches have largely been built, namely
the theories of efficient and rational markets. The Review suggests that these
assumptions are now subject to extensive challenge on both theoretical and empirical
grounds. The Review acknowledges that these assumptions have always been subject to
some challenge.
This substantially understates the position. The Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) has
been subject to stringent criticism since its genesis in the late 1960s, particularly from
the behavioural school. Behavioural theories have their roots in the seminal article by
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1974). The merits of the two opposing theories
have been subject to vigorous debate for more than 30 years.
EMH has indeed been a very controversial subject as a glance at the titles of some
journal articles shows:
 Reports of the death of the efficient markets hypothesis are greatly exaggerated;
 The end of behavioural finance;
 Behavioural finance: past battles and future engagements;
 A fresh look at the efficient markets hypothesis: how the intellectual history of
finance encouraged a real "fraud-on-the-market".
George M. Frankfurter and Elton G. McGoun (1999) criticised EMH and suggested that
EMH is based upon an ideology. They refer to Fama's original definition: a market in
which prices always fully reflect available information is called “efficient” – see Eugene F.
Fama (1970). Frankfurter and McGoun suggest that the language used in EMH is value-
impregnated: in Western culture, and especially in Protestant ethics, “efficiency” is a
morally good thing. They take issue with the notion that EMH, and positive economic
theories generally, are value-neutral.
From a different direction, Nobel laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz has long questioned
the basic premise of neoclassical economics that perfectly competitive markets generate
Pareto efficient resource allocations. Stiglitz has taken the view that there is something
seriously wrong with the standard competitive equilibrium model which assumes perfect,
or near perfect, information. He shows how even a small amount of information
imperfection can have profound effects on the nature of the equilibrium. In the
information economics paradigm which Stiglitz outlines, markets are almost never Pareto
efficient - see, for example, Stiglitz (1981, 2002).
The limitations of mathematical modelling in economics are also well documented. In
earlier research, Wassily Leontief (1971) was concerned about the uncritical enthusiasm
for mathematical modelling and the weak empirical foundation of much economic theory
based upon such modelling. A more recent critique can be found in Alexander Rosenberg
(1994).
In the light of this literature, the question which arises is: why have regulators based
their regulatory philosophies on the theories of efficient markets? Have regulators only
just discovered the limitations of these theories? Or have regulators been captured by
advocates of free markets and minimal regulation? Regulators are of course subject to
political control and are bound to follow the prevailing political ideology which has its
roots in the Thatcher/Reagan era of the 1980’s. The current financial crisis has brought
about a change in sentiment in the political market place. The change in regulatory
philosophy now proposed by the FSA is more a function of this ideological change than a
reappraisal of the fundamental economic theories.
Our argument is that in order to identify the reasons behind the crisis, it is important to
examine the behaviour of politicians and regulators as well as the behaviour of market
participants. Politicians and regulators are subject to the same bounded rationality and
decision making biases as market participants. Business leaders believe their own
stories, but then so do politicians and regulators. Politicians and regulators also have
their own interests to protect. They can be subject to conflicts of interest.
The Turner Review (2009) signals a major change in regulatory philosophy. Such a
change is a political necessity and responds to the public call for action. It represents a
major shift in the power balance in the financial market place, the market place being
occupied by politicians and regulators as well as business leaders. The Review can be
seen as a statement of this changing power balance. As such, the Review does not, and
cannot, contain a critique of the role of politicians and regulators in the crisis, other than
the necessary acknowledgement of the insufficiency of past regulation.
But this change in the power balance in the political/financial market place also has risks
which are not identified in the Review. An era of what is perceived as under-regulation
may be succeeded by an era of over-regulation (or by inappropriate and ineffective
regulation). We return to this point later in this paper.
1.2 The real market failure
Although, in the light of the above, The Turner Review (2009) is not very persuasive
with regard to the reasons it gives for the change in the FSA's regulatory philosophy, it
undoubtedly identifies correctly many of causes of the crisis. It is correct in pointing out
the increased interconnectedness of the global economy and the relationship between
growing macroeconomic imbalances and financial innovation. Clearly, the development
of new financial instruments, the invisible chains of multiple relationships between
multiple institutions, the increase in leverage, inappropriate remuneration policies linked
to short term performance and the increase in the size of the financial sector relative to
the real economy all contributed to the near collapse of the financial system. These are
real and substantial issues in the financial system which require major action by
governments’ regulators and commercial organisations.
2. The State Failure Approach to Regulation
2.1 The theoretical and empirical foundations
The set of theories which fall under this heading have their origin in the evaluation of the
regulatory regimes which were put in place in the USA following the depression of the
1930s. Questions about the efficacy of these regimes began to emerge in the 1960s.
George J. Stigler (1971) argued that industries and occupations with political power had
demanded regulation to restrict entry and to enhance their own economic welfare. There
was a demand for regulation which politicians were happy to supply. Sam Peltzman
(1976) saw Stigler as presenting a revisionist view of regulation. Regulation was
previously seen as serving the public interest but there was a growing realisation that
this was not always the case. Politicians, like the rest of us, are self interested
maximizers. Richard A. Posner (1971) suggested that one of the properties of regulation
was akin to taxation: regulation could be used to redistribute wealth. A number of
authors have picked up this theme, arguing that politicians exploit this property of
regulation as it provides opportunities to raise taxation and distribute benefits without
the accountability of normal forms of taxation. Gary S. Becker (1983) suggested that
competition among pressure groups for political influence determines the equilibrium
structure of taxes, subsidies and other political favours.
Richard H. K. Vietor (1994) conducted a detailed study of four regulated industries in the
USA (banking, telecoms, gas transmission and airlines) and four leading companies in
those industries. He found that the regulation of these industries had major unexpected
and undesirable effects upon competition and economic welfare. Regulation controlled
both strategic and operational decision-making in companies. But regulators were unable
to keep up with economic and technological change and the regulatory regimes became
divorced from reality. A number of other studies have reached similar conclusions, for
example, in the crisis affecting the Savings and Loan industry in the USA (which we refer
to again later).
This work contributed to a change in sentiment starting in the late 1970s which led to
the deregulation of a number of industries and the re-regulation of others. The UK
experience was different, with the extensive use of public ownership and the unique
history of financial services in the City of London. But in the USA and UK, and elsewhere,
there was a change in the balance of power in markets, with politicians and regulators
generally taking a less active role.
2.2 Regulatory failure in financial services
Although, across the economy as a whole, the level of regulation and government
intervention in markets reduced in the 1980s, financial services have still been actively
regulated. The Basel Accord and the UK regulatory regimes (prudential and conduct of
business regulation) both have their origins in the 1980s. It is of course these regimes
which are subject to scrutiny now, following the global financial crisis. The Turner Review
(2009) along with the prevailing political sentiment, takes the view that the problem
with these regimes is that they were deficient, in the sense that they were too light or
not “scary” enough. There is, however, an alternative view based upon the ideas of state
failure. A good example is provided in the recent Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA)
publication referred to earlier – Booth (2009).
In the IEA compilation, a number of authors put forward evidence of government and
regulatory failures which they argue have contributed to the financial crisis.
 John Greenwood (2009) suggests that UK monetary policy went off the rails in the
three year period from 2005 until the beginning of 2008; the UK’s Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC), with the responsibility for setting interest rates, underestimated
the potential impact on inflation of rapid money growth and the impact on financial
stability of overvalued asset prices;
 Eamonn Butler (2009) and Anna J. Schwartz (2009) identify loose monetary policy
in the USA over a longer period. They also refer to USA government policy of
promoting home ownership to borrowers with below median incomes. Congress
and the White House subsidised low-income housing outside the budget, at least in
the short run, through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This led to banks making bad
loans and to a boom in house prices. The bubble burst in 2006. As identified in The
Turner Review (2009), this was the direct antecedent of the global financial crisis;
 James Alexander (2009), Michael Beenstock (2009), and Kevin Dowd (2009)
concentrate on regulatory failure, and particularly, the failure of capital regulation.
But in this analysis, unlike the analysis in The Turner Review, regulation fails by
acts of commission. Regulation encouraged banks to create opaque financial
instruments and to use similar risk models. Regulation made banks more
accountable to their regulators than to their shareholders. Relevant information
was available to regulators but not to market participants, undermining market
discipline.
This critique of regulation does not arise by virtue of hindsight. The emergence of new
financial instruments designed to avoid capital regulation has been well signalled.
Research sponsored by the Basel Committee (Patricia Jackson 1999) showed that
innovations in the market had enabled banks to arbitrage between the economic capital
that banks felt they should be holding and their regulatory defined capital (see also
David Jones 2000). John F. Mahon and Edwin A. Murray (1981) proposed, following a
study of the regulation of insurance companies in the USA, that as the environment in
which the firm operates becomes more regulated, the less the focus of organisational
planning on the customer or consumer, and the greater the emphasis on the regulator.
This clearly has implications for the more intensive regulation proposed by the UK’s
Financial Services Authority.
In another of the IEA publications, Congdon (2009) provides the theoretical basis for the
lender of last resort function of a central bank. He shows that this function arises
endogenously in the market and does not need to be imposed by the state. There is no
need for the central bank to be publicly owned, and there are good arguments for the
privatisation of the Bank of England.
Congdon argues that the lender of last resort function and the supervision of banks are
complementary activities. Central banks should only lend to solvent banks with transient
liquidity problems. In order to distinguish the insolvent bank from the illiquid, the central
bank needs the data and understanding from its banking supervision. The transfer of
banking supervision from the Bank of England to the FSA in late 1990s was therefore a
mistake. The consequence was that when the problem of the UK’s Northern Rock Bank
arose in 2007, no one in the Tripartite relationship (involving the Treasury, Bank of
England and FSA) knew what to do. The Bank of England seemed to regard its sole
function as controlling interest rates. It failed to act as lender of last resort to Northern
Rock. It also frustrated the takeover of this bank by Lloyds TSB by failing to agree to
back-up facilities for Lloyds TSB. Congdon argues, therefore, that the Bank of England
failed in its duty to act as lender of last resort.
Again, this critique of regulation does not arise with hindsight. The wisdom of creating
the monolith of the FSA was questioned at the time – see Michael Taylor (1997). The
FSA's predecessor, the Securities and Investments Board (SIB), had a turbulent history
since its inception in the mid-1980s. It can be argued that the structure of the UK's
regulatory institutions is still not fit for purpose.
In its operations, the UK regulatory regime that has been in place since the mid-1980s
has been subject to much criticism. Most recently the criticism has come from the UK’s
Parliamentary Ombudsman in its report on the Equitable Life affair – see Ann Abraham
(2008). This sorry saga has yet to be fully resolved as government has been reluctant to
accept the recommendations of the Ombudsman which raises important questions about
the accountability of regulators.
2.3 The real state failure
Whatever one thinks of the theory of state failure, some policies and actions of
governments and regulators have contributed to the crisis. The promotion of home
ownership with little regard to affordability; the uncontrolled extension of credit; the
failures of monetary policy; unwise changes to regulatory institutions and the failure of
regulatory operations all contributed to the crisis. Arguably, the FSA (as well as other
regulatory authorities in some other countries), has failed to meet one of its statutory
objectives, namely to maintain confidence in the financial system.
If regulation has failed in the past to achieve its objectives and/or has unforeseen and
undesirable consequences there is no reason to suppose that such failure and
consequences will not arise in the future. Who is to regulate the regulators? In principle,
regulators are accountable to politicians but the role of politicians can be questioned as
indicated above. Who regulates our politicians? Are our democratic institutions
sufficiently robust to hold politicians to account?
3. Market Failure and State Failure – A Synthesis
The above narrative shows that arguments can be put forward for both “market failure”
and “state failure” in the analysis of the causes of the global financial crisis. To an
external observer, not involved in transactions in the market place or in its regulation,
this may not seem surprising. To err is human, and mistakes will be made by all
participants in any complex system. The advocates of market failure on the one hand
and state failure on the other hand look like competitors for power in the financial
system. Over the decades power relationships have changed, as sentiment and vested
interests have changed. Regulation has been followed by deregulation (or reregulation)
and we are now destined for a period of increased regulation. We might expect, as the
impact of the new regulatory regime reveals itself over the next decade or so, that there
will be a change in sentiment in favour of deregulation at some stage in the future.
3.1 The interdependence of the market and the state
The point we wish to make in this context is that the perception of the state as being
somehow outside the economic system is false. The state is not exogenous to the
market. In particular, the state provides the framework of law which creates the
foundations of the economic system. The economic system which evolved in the Western
world is underpinned by a substantial legal framework (and underlying culture) which
provides, among other things:
 The creation and protection of property rights;
 The recognition and enforcement of contractual agreements;
 The creation of money as means of exchange for goods and services;
 The creation of a duty of care in defined circumstances, with provision for
compensation for loss in the event of negligence;
 Competition and fair trading rules to protect market participants from fraud and
other abuses;
 Governance and accountancy rules;
 The right to create a corporate entity with limited liability;
 Procedures for the resolution of disputes and the prosecution of offenders;
 The creation of state agencies to design, change and enforce the rules.
The economic system in which we work cannot exist without this framework of law and
culture. The idea of a “free market”, a market free of state intervention, fails to
recognise this reality. Also, the idea that “market failure” justifies state intervention
misses the point. The concept of a perfect market arose in economic theory as an
attempt to simplify economic phenomena to make them tractable to analysis. The
application of economic theory and mathematical models to actual economic systems
without an understanding of the simplifying assumptions made in those theories is
fallacious. Real markets are imperfect and cannot be assumed to be efficient. The idea
that the state can somehow “perfect” occasional “imperfections” in otherwise perfect
markets fails, therefore, to recognise the realities of markets (and, of course, of the
limitations of the political process).
The interdependence of the market and the state can also be seen in the management of
the public finances. Governments finance their expenditure by raising taxes and by
issuing debt. Taxes are paid by, and money is lent to government by, corporations and
individuals. Corporations and individuals cannot then use this money in the markets but
governments spend it instead. Government uses money to buy goods and services in the
market and redistributes some money in the form of benefits and grants to other
individuals or bodies. Public finance and private finance are, therefore, intimately linked.
3.2 The need for a new conceptual framework
The conceptual framework in which the debate about regulation takes place is therefore
flawed. We need a new conceptual framework which recognises the reality of the political
and economic system in which elected representatives, state officials and corporations
are all participants. This will facilitate a more informed, and hopefully a less polemical,
discourse about the actions that those participants need to take in the light of changing
circumstances.
Adopting a new conceptual framework does not mean that we immediately abandon all
we have learnt about how economic systems work. We still, for example, recognise
information asymmetry but not as a “market failure” which justifies “state intervention”;
instead it is a market phenomenon. As a market phenomenon, information asymmetry
may or may not be a problem in any particular context. If it is a problem, there may or
may not be a cost effective solution. In some contexts information asymmetry may
provide an incentive for entrepreneurial activity creating new sources of wealth. In this
new conceptual framework, information asymmetry is not automatically regarded as a
market failure which requires regulatory action.
A new conceptual framework will help to refocus the discourse about how the powers
within the system (politicians, regulators and major corporations) manage the system to
minimise the risks of crises and maximise economic welfare. It will help to shift the
debate from ideological propositions to an examination of the system itself and the
relationship between the various actors in the system. The Turner Review (2009), along
with many commentators on the crisis, recognises the importance of the relationships
between the UK’s Tripartite institutions (the Treasury, the Bank of England and the FSA).
The importance of the relationships between each of these official institutions and
financial institutions generally is recognised implicitly in the analysis but such recognition
needs to become much more explicit and transparent.
The behaviour of one actor in the system will affect the behaviour of other actors and in
turn will determine economic outcomes. Reflecting on past events we can see, for
example, how the public policy in the USA of promoting lending to individuals on lower
than average incomes for house purchase affected the lending behaviour of the banks.
In turn, this increased the risks of credit defaults and the risk of house price bubbles. We
can see how capital regulation created incentives for financial institutions to innovate to
produce new financial instruments to avoid that regulation which in turn created serious
systemic risks in the system.
Looking forward, if regulators now impose more prescriptive rules upon banks, and seek
to impose their judgements upon the boards of the banks, then this is likely to make
those boards more accountable to the regulators than to shareholders, undermining
market discipline. What will be the medium to longer term impact of this initiative? How
will banks respond? Will they seek to innovate to avoid regulatory prescriptions or will
they use political influence to frustrate the activities of the regulators? Will the initiative
stifle beneficial innovation, reducing economic welfare? How will this initiative affect the
growing corporate social responsibility and sustainable business agenda? Will it remove
the incentives and opportunities for banks to create sustainable business models and to
rebuild trust in their brands?
If regulators do not have the answers to these questions, they will not be able to assess
the risks of their own activities and to put in place actions to mitigate undesirable
outcomes which extensive research on past regulatory activity has shown is almost
certain to occur. The Turner Review (2009) is notable for the absence of any risk
assessment of its proposals. No doubt we will have, in due course, a regulatory impact
assessment but the FSA is setting in place a substantial agenda without even a
preliminary assessment of the risks of adverse consequences. Also, when we do come to
the regulatory impact assessment, do we have sufficient understanding of the dynamics
of the system to make a reasonable assessment of the risks?
In summary, we are arguing here that we need a greater understanding of the
boundaries of and the dynamics of the political and economic system. We need a better
understanding of the inter-relationships in the system and of the effect that the actions
of one actor in the system has on the other actors and the system as a whole.
3.3 The need for transparency and public accountability
There is already a demand for more transparency in the relationship between the
regulator and regulated institutions, as evidenced recently by the request for information
about the stress tests carried out by the FSA with the UK’s banks. On the other hand, it
is important that the Tripartite institutions should be able to conduct some business with
financial institutions in private, to protect commercial confidentiality. There is also a very
good argument in favour of allowing the Bank of England to make facilities available to
banks covertly to avoid market panic. So there is a balance to be struck.
But with this caveat, there is a need for increased accountability of politicians and
regulators, and indeed the financial institutions which are crucial to our economic
welfare. Clearly, the financial crisis has raised public awareness and concern. More
recently, the publication of details of British politicians’ own financial affairs has raised
wider concerns about our democratic governance. Moving forward now, what will be the
mechanisms by which the powerful actors in the political/economic system will account
to the wider public for their behaviour?
Some governance issues are addressed by The Walker Review (2009) of the UK banking
industry. However, in the Terms of Reference of this Review there is a lack of explicit
recognition of the interconnectedness of the system in which boards of banks and
institutional shareholders operate alongside governments and regulators. It is clearly
relevant to ask questions about the balance of skills, experience and independence
required on boards of banking institutions, but what about the institutions in the
Tripartite arrangement? The Tripartite parties are taking much greater powers within the
economic system but do they have the required skills and experience? Are there
sufficient checks and balances within the system? How will the Tripartite parties be
accountable for their actions?
4. Towards a New Conceptual Framework
The first step in creating a new conceptual framework is the recognition of the need for
one, which follows from the recognition of the limitations of the current framework. We
hope that this paper will start this debate, moving us on from the rather sterile
arguments about market failure and state failure.
The next step is to identify the key elements that the new framework needs to contain.
We have argued that we should regard politicians, regulators and financial institutions as
part of the same political/economic system. We have started to redefine the boundaries
of the system we seek to examine. The Turner Review (2009) argues, cogently, that we
need to see regulatory policy in the context of the macroeconomic and global
environments. The Review therefore redefines the boundary of what was previously
regarded as relevant. We wish to go further and recognise that the behaviour of
politicians, regulators and financial institutions is intimately linked. The relationships
between these actors in the political/economic system are therefore relevant.
Also relevant are the relationships between the various structures in the system. For
example, the issue of leverage cannot be understood without examining the effect of the
law on limited liability and the impact of fiscal rules which distinguish between the costs
of equity and debt. The rules on limited liability create the opportunity for leverage and
fiscal rules increase the rewards to shareholders from debt financing. The elements of
the legal framework in which commerce is conducted, as outlined above, are intimately
linked.
The task, therefore, to develop a new conceptual framework involves redefining the
boundaries of the system and examining the relationships within the system as newly
defined. As indicated earlier, we do not abandon all the information and knowledge we
have about how economic systems work, particularly the learning from the most recent
events. What we need to do is to re-examine and reflect on the past in the light of the
newly defined system. This is an iterative process. As we re-examine the past with a new
approach we will develop the new conceptual framework.
We also need to examine in more detail the relationships between the actors in the
system in order to understand how the behaviour of one actor affects the behaviour of
others, and hence increase our understanding of how the system evolves. We do not
have a shared understanding of the relationships between regulators and financial
institutions, between financial institutions and politicians and between politicians and
regulators. This is a closed world. It needs to become much more open.
If we are to make progress with this agenda, then governments, regulators and financial
institutions all need to be prepared to be more open and accountable. This will be
especially difficult for governments. It will also be difficult for financial institutions
seeking to recover from the crisis and to rebuild their reputations with the public at
large. But public accountability must be a top priority as we move forward. The new
conceptual framework must define what accountability consists of and what the
mechanisms are for providing accountability.
In this paper we are not attempting to produce a finished blueprint of a new conceptual
framework. Our primary aim is to open up the debate on the need for a new way of
thinking. But we can start to use the ideas we have presented to produce a preliminary
risk assessment of the proposals contained in The Turner Review (2009) and in the FSA
Discussion Paper (2009).
5. The Risks within the FSA’s Proposals
As indicated earlier, research into various industries, particularly in the USA, has
suggested that prescriptive regulation has unforeseen and adverse consequences. A
number of authors (see for example George J. Benston 1985; William H. Starbuck and P.
Narayan Pant 1996) cite regulation as one of the main causes of the collapse of the US
Savings and Loan (S&L) industry in the 1980s. The initial cause of the problem was the
specialisation of S&Ls in fixed interest rate long term mortgages funded by short term
savings deposits with regulated interest rates and subject to federal deposit insurance.
This business model was imposed by regulation going back to the 1930s and was
supported by tax subsidies and by custom. When short term interest rates rose from
around 7% in 1978 to 16% in 1981, S&Ls faced a run on their deposits. Congress began
to deregulate deposit rates in 1980 which helped S&Ls stem the outflow of funds but
also led to interest margins becoming negative as the rate on mortgages could not be
increased. Subsequent regulatory action failed to stem the crisis which was building and
may have contributed to the collapse of more S&L institutions.
5.1 Identifying the risks
Studies such as those into the S&L industry show that serious issues arise when
regulators usurp the decision making power of boards of companies. This has
implications for the FSA's decision to move to 'intensive supervision', and particularly for
the proposition that "... supervisors will make judgements of the judgements of firms'
senior management and require action if, in their view, the latter pose risks to the FSA's
objectives." – see FSA (2009, para 1.66). This statement is at odds with the statement
in the previous paragraph that "... a firm's senior management must always carry
responsibility for their actions" but more generally, the FSA's approach raises a number
of significant governance issues.
The FSA is effectively saying that it is prepared, in pursuit of its own objectives, to veto
commercial decisions made by the senior management of financial institutions. This
raises questions about the accountability of the directors of financial institutions, about
the role of non-executive directors and shareholders, and about the accountability of the
FSA supervisors.
Where an FSA supervisor vetoes a decision made by directors and imposes his/her own
decision then those directors cannot be held accountable for the decision of the
supervisor. Where the issue in question goes to the heart of the firm's business strategy,
and to its competitive position in the market, then it will be difficult for shareholders to
hold directors to account for the strategic direction of the company and for its financial
performance. How will directors and shareholders respond in these circumstances?
Directors who have their decisions over-ruled by supervisors will lose authority so they
may seek prior agreement from the supervisor on key strategic issues. Likewise,
institutional shareholders may seek to engage with FSA supervisors on the investment
strategies of financial institutions. Similarly, nonexecutive directors may build
relationships with the supervisor. The focus of strategic decision making will therefore
shift to the FSA.
Is the regulator equipped to fulfil the role of setting the strategic commercial direction of
financial institutions? Does the regulator have the necessary depth and quality in its
supervisory resources? Supervisors will need to be capable of spotting systemic risks but
they will also need to have commercial skills if they are to be engaged in the strategic
business decision-making of financial institutions. If a supervisor imposes a commercial
decision on a financial institution which turns out to be disastrous for this institution, will
the regulator be accountable to the shareholders for the financial loss they suffer and will
the regulator/government pay compensation if it is found that there is
maladministration?
If the regulator is to be involved in the strategic decision making of financial institutions,
how will the marketplace evolve in the coming years? How will the regulator's
involvement affect competition, the evolution of sustainable business models and the
economic performance of the market? The experience in the USA showed that where
regulators set deposit and lending rates, the banking market stabilised for a time but
this proved to be unsustainable. Regulators were unable to make key strategic decisions
in a period of changing economic, social and technological circumstances.
The UK’s FSA may not be seeking to set deposit and lending rates, but the implications
of intensive supervision are that it will be involved in decisions on business models so
the same risks will arise as those which manifested themselves in the regulated market
place in the USA prior to the deregulation of the 1980s. The risks are that markets will
become dysfunctional and fail to meet the expectations of consumers and investors.
Financial institutions may become economically unsustainable.
The FSA's regulatory approach, therefore, contains substantial risks which need to be
managed. Intensive supervision will affect the behaviour of executives in the financial
services industry. It is of course intended to affect behaviour, but it may not do so as
expected. Moving forward, regulators will see changes in behaviour of executives and
will then respond. Executives will respond to the regulator's response, and so on.
Political circumstances will change also, and decisions made by governments will affect
economic outcomes. The risk is that after a time financial markets become economically
unsustainable.
5.2 Mitigating the risks
Managing these risks involves, first of all, recognising their nature. This brings us back to
the need for a new conceptual framework. We need to recognise, firstly, that the
behaviour of politicians, regulators and financial institutions are intimately linked. The
mitigating action for the risks identified then follows. We need to observe the behaviour
of all these participants in the political/economic system as we move forward along with
the performance of the market. As indicated above, we can learn from a re-examination
of the past and from a new study of the relationships that have existed between the
participants in the recent past. But circumstances have changed since the recent global
financial crisis. Governments and regulators are now taking a much more leading role.
The balance of power has shifted so it is crucial to examine the relationships as they
evolve.
A second mitigating action is to examine the relationships between the structures within
the system, the inter-relationship between the elements of the underlying legal and
cultural framework. So, taking again the issue of leverage, it may be that there are
better ways of responding to the problem than new regulatory prescriptions. We could
examine how the rules on limited liability, the fiscal rules and the functioning of the
equity markets relate to each other and create the incentives for increasing debt finance
as opposed to equity. It may be that changing some of these underlying rules will be
more effective in reducing systemic risk by improving market discipline.
This is not going to be an easy task, but if we do not undertake it, we will be faced with
another crisis which will have its origins in the response to the present crisis.
6. Looking Forward
We end this paper by looking at how events might unfold. What are the possible
scenarios?
We have been here before. Joseph G. Nellis and Stephen Regan (1997) argued that a
global economy without adequate relationships between the state and multinational
business would not serve the interests of businesses any more than it would serve the
interests of the wider communities to which businesses belong. The authors identified
the risks within the system as it then was in the 1990s, including the instabilities arising
from unregulated capital flows; concerns about the role of stateless multi-national
companies dedicated to the sole objective of maximising shareholder value; and the
risks of new instruments such as derivatives. Nellis and Regan identified the potential for
a future liquidity crisis in the global economy and the lack of capability to respond to a
sudden crash in financial markets.
So how do we assess the current situation as we finalise this paper in January 2011? The
omens are not good. For example, it is common ground that one of the causes of the
financial crisis was the bonus culture within financial institutions which encouraged short
term thinking and high risk activity. But as we write, the UK government seems to have
given up in its attempt to address the issue; see for example The Financial Times (2011)
and BBC (2011). Banks and other large financial institutions have succeeded in
persuading the government not to take any further action on this front. As we suggested
above, prescriptive rules would not work (except perhaps in the very short term). The
government was wise, therefore, not to go down this route. But the issue still needs to
be addressed and there can be no better time for the government to bring pressure to
bear on financial institutions. The political context is a time of severe public expenditure
constraints affecting the public at large, and especially the more vulnerable in society,
yet the banks can provide rewards to its executives and employees that most people can
only dream of. If in these circumstances the banks are not responsive, then it bodes ill
for the future.
But the issue raises a more general question: how can financial institutions make the
profits implied by these bonuses at a time when the global economy is emerging from
recession? One of the other well recognised causes of the financial crisis was the growth
of the financial sector relative to the real economy. The “financialization” of the economy
was a major issue. Financialization is a process whereby financial markets, financial
institutions and financial elites gain greater influence over economic policy and economic
outcomes. It involves a transfer of income from the real sector to the financial sector, an
increase in income inequality and a contribution to wage stagnation (Thomas I. Palley
2007). If governments, regulators and financial institutions do not recognise and deal
with this issue, then it will remain a risk to the real economy.
Clearly, the relationship between the state and the financial sector has not matured to a
point where the bonus culture and the related issue of financialization can be dealt with.
This in turn raises questions about the progress of the new regime of “intensive
supervision” which was introduced by the FSA and which we described above. Where
does the balance of power lie now in the relationship between the FSA and the banks?
We simply do not know: this is a closed world. Likewise we know little about how the
relationship between the regulatory authorities in different countries is developing, and
whether the global risks, which we have referred to, are being addressed effectively.
This uncertainty can only lead us to be pessimistic about the future. The global economy
will no doubt emerge from recession but we are not convinced that the underlying
problems which gave rise to the financial crash of 2007/8 have been, or are being,
solved. There remains, therefore, a risk of a future financial crisis.
We are not alone in trying to be prophetic. Kosta Josifidis, Alpar Lošonc, and Novica
Supić (2010) set out two possible scenarios for the global economy. The first scenario, 
which they term inertial, is based upon the assumption that the crisis and the recession
are cyclic in character. Within 2-4 years, possibly less, the economy will have recovered
and governments will divest themselves of the responsibilities they assumed at the start
of the crisis. We then carry on as before until the next slump. The second scenario,
which Josifidis, Lošonc, and Supić call pessimistic/realistic starts from the proposition
that the crisis of 2007/8 was not cyclic but was systemic and structural in character. This
scenario is pessimistic in the sense that it regards the crisis as very serious and it is
realistic as it prepares for more significant consequences: an evolutionary point has been
reached which requires fundamental and comprehensive change. This involves
abandoning the dominant paradigm of neo-liberalism and market fundamentalism and
incorporating corporate social responsibility.
So which scenario are we following? The rhetoric from governments around the time of
the crisis, which is reflected in the Turner Review, suggests that we need to follow the
second route. But as economies recover and as banks regain confidence (and feel
immune to public pressure), we are seeing the first signs of a reversion to the first
scenario. We cannot help feel that we are indeed heading for the next crisis. The only
question is: when it will strike?
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the traditional “market failure” and “state failure”
approaches to the regulation of financial markets. Both approaches have some validity
and identify causes of the financial crisis. But advocates of each position offer only
partial and polarised views. We have offered a synthesis, arguing that we need a new
conceptual framework which recognises the relationship between the various actors in an
increasingly complex political and economic system. We seek to redefine the boundaries
of the system which needs to be examined, recognising that politicians, regulators and
financial institutions are all actors within the same system. The market cannot be seen
as separate from the state.
This new conceptual framework leads to a better understanding of the interlinked causes
of the crisis and the risks arising from the regulatory changes now put in place.
Mitigation of those risks requires a study of the behaviour of the various actors in the
system, alongside traditional economic analysis. This requires politicians, regulators and
financial institutions to be more open to public scrutiny. Worryingly, the early indications
are that the fundamental issues which gave rise to the global financial crisis are not
being adequately addressed.
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